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Punitive Damages and the Spill Felt
Round the World: A U.S. Perspective
SUSANAH MEAD*
I. INTRODUCION
JURY AWARDS $3.5 MILLION PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN
COFFEE SPILL CASE!
In recent years, headlines such as this have grabbed the
attention of the U.S. public and fanned the flames of tort reform,
creating the now widely held perception that punitive damage
awards have run amuck in the United States. The accuracy of this
perception is open to question. Empirical studies assessing the
impact of punitive damage awards in product liability actions
generally have concluded that such awards are infrequent.'
Nevertheless, tort reform advocates have launched frontal attacks
on the punitive damages remedy at both the state and federal
level, citing it as a prime example of the lawsuit abuse that "saps
* Professor of Law at Indiana University School of Law, Indianapolis; B.A., Smith
College; J.D., Indiana University School of Law, Indianapolis; former law clerk to the
Honorable Paul H. Buchanan, Jr., Chief Judge of the Indiana Court of Appeals. Professor
Mead teaches and writes in the areas of torts and products liability.
1. See, e.g., MARK PETERSON ET AL., PUNITIVE DAMAGES-EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
(The RAND Corp., Institute for Civil Justice) (1987) (finding few awards of punitive
damages in product liability cases in locations studied); American Bar Foundation Project,
Study of Punitive Damages (1987) (suggesting punitive damages awards are relatively rare
in product liability cases); MICHAEL RUSTAD, DEMYSTIFYING PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN
PRODUCTS LIABILITY CASES: A SURVEY OF A QUARTER CENTURY OF TRIAL VERDICTS
(The Roscoe Pound Foundation) (Lee Hays Romano ed., 1991) (suggesting punitive
damage awards are rarely awarded in products liability cases, are even more rarely paid,
and frequently are reduced by settlement and appeals); Richard C. Reuben, Plaintiffs
Rarely Win Punitives, Study Says, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1995, at 26 (discussing a 1995 U.S.
Department of Justice report that concluded that plaintiffs were awarded punitive damages
in only six percent of the cases they won, and received more than $50,000 in only half of
those cases).
829
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
our economy, eliminates jobs, pits neighbor aainst neighbor and
injures our country's global competitiveness.
Business interests contend that punitive damage awards are
"unpredictable bolts of lightning wielded by vengeful juries
inflamed by prejudice versus large corporations, untutored in how
to calculate the appropriate fine and egged on by greedy plaintiffs'
lawyers salivating at the prospect of huge contingency fees.",
3
Consumer-advocates insist, however, that punitive damages are "a
necessary remedy against the abuse of power by economic elites."4
A resolution of this argument is beyond the scope of this Article,
which considers how a U.S. appellate judge would review a multi-
million dollar punitive damage award assessed against one of the
world's largest fast food chains after a consumer suffered serious
burns from spilling coffee on himself Nevertheless, appellate
courts do not render decisions in a vacuum. Any U.S. judge
reviewing a $3.5 million punitive damage award in a coffee spill
case would be well aware that his or her decision will be the
subject of intense scrutiny.
II. "REMEMBER MCDONALDS"
Indeed, a U.S. judge addressing the issue today has the
example of what happened in a strikingly similar case. In the now-
famous McDonald's coffee spill case, a jury awarded $2.9 million
in punitive damages.' The trial judge reduced the punitive
damage award to $480,000, but it was the jury award that made
"Remember McDonalds" the rallying cry for the latest round of
U.S. tort reform. It is against this backdrop that an appellate
judge would review the award of punitive damages in Smith v.
MegaFood. At first glance, the punitive damage award in this case
might appear to be a stark example of all that is amiss in the U.S.
tort system. Nevertheless, a judge reviewing the award on appeal
2. Neil A. Lewis, House Votes to Help Medical Profession in Court, N.Y. TIMES
March 10, 1995, at Al (quoting Rep. Henry Hyde, sponsor of "Common Sense Legal
Reforms Act"). See also, Janet Fix & Jessica Lee, Liability Reform on Today's Agenda,
USA TODAY, March 10, 1995, at A4.
3. Ruth Marcus, Are Punitive Damage Awards Fair to Firms? Supreme Court Finally
Agrees To Referee High-Stakes Dispute, WASH. POST, Sept. 23, 1990, at H1.
4. Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, The Historical Continuity of Punitive Damages
Awards: Reforming the Tort Reformers, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1269, 1276 (1993).
5. Liebeck v. McDonald's Restaurants, No. CV-93-02419, 1994 WL 360309, at *1
(N.M. Dist. Ct. Apr. 18, 1994).
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must carefully address a host of issues to decide whether the
punitive damages award was justified.
The judge must go through a multi-step process to resolve
those issues. As a preliminary matter, the judge should deter-
mine whether any policy concerns or constitutional considerations
might preclude punitive damages. If satisfied that none do, the
judge must examine the procedures and standards employed by the
trial court to determine whether the jury had sufficient guidance
on the punitive damages issue. If the procedures and standards
were adequate, the court must examine the record to see whether
the evidence supported the jury's conclusion regarding the punitive
damages issue. If the judge concludes that the jury's decision to
award punitive damages was justified, the judge also must decide
whether the amount of punitive damages awarded by the jury
should stand or whether it should be reduced.
Before determining whether the award and its amount were
appropriate, however, it is necessary to make some assumptions
about the law that is applicable to punitive damages in the
jurisdiction in which the judge will be rendering his or her opinion.
Approaches to punitive damages in the United States vary
considerably from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Although the
doctrine of punitive damages generally is a product of the common
law, some state statutes address the subject. Several states have
enacted specific tort reform measures affecting punitive damages.
This Article assumes that no tort reform measures affecting
punitive damages have been adopted. This Article also states
assumptions about the procedures and standards employed by the
trial court at relevant points in the discussion.
III. REVIEWING THE PuNmvE DAMAGES AWARD
A U.S. appellate judge probably would begin his or her review
of the punitive damage award assessed against MegaFood by
recalling the purpose of awarding punitive damages in tort cases.
Although the primary function of tort damages is to compensate
victims of tortious conduct, all but a few U.S. jurisdictions permit
6. In an actual appeal, of course, the judge would be aided by briefs from the parties.
In this case, however, the judge is limited to the information in the record provided and
to his or her knowledge of the applicable legal principles.
7. Louisiana, Massachusetts, Nebraska and Washington prohibit punitive damages.
See Killebrew v. Abbott Lab., 359 So. 2d 1275, 1278 (La. 1978); City of Lowell v.
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awards of punitive or exemplary damages against defendants
whose conduct has been especially blameworthy. Although courts
in a few jurisdictions have held that punitive damages serve a
compensatory purpose,' it generally is agreed that the function of
punitive damages is to punish the defendant for particularly
outrageous conduct and to deter the defendant and others from
similar misconduct in the future.9
A. The History of Punitive Damages
A judge with an academic bent might recall the history of the
remedy. The practice of assessing punitive damages to punish
particularly blameworthy conduct is centuries old. The Code of
Hammurabi,0  the Old Testament," Roman law, 2  and
Blackstone's Commentaries on the Law of England3 make
references to such a remedy. By the late eighteenth century, the
doctrine had made its way to the United States.4 As the
Industrial Revolution evolved and U.S. industry flourished, so did
the potential for oppressive conduct by powerful corporations
against individuals. The doctrine of punitive damages kept pace.
By the end of the nineteenth century, punitive damage awards to
punish and deter particularly egregious corporate misconduct had
become commonplace in the United States."
Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 47 N.E.2d 265,271 (Mass. 1943); Abel v. Conover, 104
N.W.2d 684, 686 (Neb. 1960); Stanard v. Bolin, 565 P.2d 94, 98 (Wash. 1977).
8. See, e.g., Collens v. New Canaan Water Co., 234 A.2d 825, 831-32 (Conn. 1967)
(asserting that punitive damage award is compensatory); Jackovich v. General Adjustment
Bureau, Inc., 326 N.W.2d 458, 464 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982) (finding punitive damages
compensate plaintiff for plaintiffs humiliation and indignity caused by defendant's tort).
9. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(1) (1965).
10. See 1 LINDA SCHLUETER & KENNETH R. REDDEN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES 3 n.1 (2d
ed. 1989) (noting punitive damages found in CODE OF HAMMURABI).
11. See, ag., Exodus 22:4 (requiring double restitution for theft); Luke 19:8 (stating
payment of four times damages caused is penalty for fraud or theft).
12. See BARRY NICHOLAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN LAW 210 (1969) (noting
distinction between actions requiring compensatory damages and actions requiring more
than compensatory damages).
13. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 1683 n.16 (William C. Jones ed., 1916).
See also Wilkes v. Wood, 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (K.B. 1763); Huckle v. Money, 95 Eng. Rep.
768 (K.B. 1763).
14. See Genay v. Norris, 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 6, 6 (1784).
15. See Seymour D. Thompson, Liability of Corporations for Exemplary Damages, 41
CENT. L.. 308 (1895).
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B. The Controversy Behind Punitive Damages
The judge, however, also would be aware that in spite of its
venerable history, the doctrine of punitive damages always has
been controversial. Critics have objected to the absence of
procedural safeguards to protect a defendant from a punishment
that is very much like a criminal fine,16 from the almost unfet-
tered discretion given juries in determining the propriety and
amount of awards, 7 and from awards which actually are unde-
served windfalls for plaintiffs. 8 Although these general criticisms
may trouble the judge, they have not been sufficient to prevent the
doctrine of punitive damages from finding acceptance in most U.S.
jurisdictions. Thus, the judge in the MegaFood case may be
assumed to be rendering his or her decision in a jurisdiction that
has recognized the validity of the punitive and deterrent functions
of punitive damages.
IV. THE CRITICISMS OF PuNTvE DAMAGES IN PRODUCT
LIABILrrY CASES
Because Smith v. MegaFood is a product injury case the judge
also would take note of the specific criticisms leveled at the
doctrine of punitive damages in the product liability context.
Although these criticisms have been variously stated, 9 they may
be reduced to five recurring concerns: (1) punitive damages against
corporations punish shareholders of defendant corporations rather
than the actual wrongdoer; (2) punitive damages in product
liability actions do not serve the goals of punishment and deter-
rence associated with such awards; (3) punitive damages in product
liability actions are not necessary to achieve optimal product
safety; (4) the fault basis of punitive damages is incompatible with
the fault-free theories of strict liability and breach of warranty; and
(5) the number of potential claims causes overpunishment which
16. See Bob Carsey, The Case Against Punitive Damages: An Annotated Argumenta-
tive Outline, 11 FORUM 57 (1975).
17. See, e.g., David 0. Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74
MIcH. L. REv. 1258, 1314-19 (1976).
18. See, e.g., Walker v. Sheldon, 179 N.E.2d 497, 501, (N.Y. 1961) (Van Voorhies, J.,
dissenting opinion); Kink v. Combs, 135 N.W2d 789, 798 (Wis. 1965).
19. See, e.g., Owen, supra note 17, at 1258 (1976); Richard D. Schuster, Note, Punitive
Awards in Strict Products Liability Litigation: The Doctrine, the Debate, the Defenses, 42
OHIO ST. L. J. 771 (1981).
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leads to adverse social and economic consequences. Before
addressing the particulars of the case, the judge should address
these concerns to decide whether, as a matter of policy, punitive
damages should not be awarded in product liability cases against
corporate defendants.
A. The Suffering Shareholder
The concern that the innocent shareholder suffers where
punitive damages are assessed against a corporation proceeds on
the assumption that, while the corporation acts through its officers
and employees, it is the corporation that pays when those acts
justify the imposition of punitive damages.' Ultimately, those
who pay when punitive damages are assessed are the shareholders
who, in all likelihood, have had no direct involvement in the
corporate misconduct. Thus, in the MegaFood case, even though
the corporate decision-makers mandated that coffee be kept at a
temperature capable of causing third degree bums, and that no
warning of this fact be given to consumers, they would not be
punished by a punitive damage award. Instead, the shareholders
of MegaFood would bear the cost. Nevertheless, an appellate
judge seeking guidance from other courts would find that most
have not been persuaded by the "innocent shareholder" argument.
Instead, courts have stressed that losses to shareholders occasioned
by punitive damages should encourage shareholders to take an
active role in overseeing corporate activity and choosing corporate
officers and policy.21
B. The Unrealistic Goal of Deterrence
Another criticism, related to the "innocent shareholder"
concern, is that punitive damage awards against corporate
defendants in product liability cases do not serve the punishment
and deterrence goals usually associated with awards of punitive
damages. The judge may be aware that this concern has elicited
substantial commentary.' Although it may be intuitively appeal-
20. For the circumstances under which liability for punitive damages can be imposed
vicariously on the principal, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 909 (1965).
21. See, e.g., Martin v. Johns-Manville Corp., 469 A.2d 655,666-67 (Pa. 1983); Wangen
v. Ford Motor Co., 294 N.W.2d 437, 453-54 (Wis. 1980).
22. See, e.g., Symposium, 40 ALA. L. REV. 687 (1988-89); Symposium, 56 So. CAL. L.
REV. 1 (1982-83); Richard C. Ausness, Retribution and Deterrence: The Role of Punitive
Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74 KY. L.J. 1 (1985-86); Gary T. Schwartz, The
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ing, the argument that punitive damage awards are effective to
punish and deter corporate misconduct is open to question. For
example, a punishment rationale arguably seems inappropriate
where the individual wrongdoer does not personally suffer the
sanction imposed. In a product liability case, the ultimate costs of
punitive damages are not assessed against the corporate officers or
employees actually responsible for the injury. Rather, they are
shifted to consumers through higher prices or to the shareholders.
Similarly, punitive damage awards are unlikely to deter future
misconduct of the present defendant, or others, if those sought to
be deterred are not the ones who pay. Furthermore, the punish-
ment and deterrence potential of punitive damages is undercut if
manufacturers insure against such losses.' Although the judge
would find support for the notion that punitive damages are a
deterrent against manufacturer misconduct,24 the judge would find
frequent challenges to their efficacy at achieving that goal.' Nev-
ertheless, it seems unlikely that a judge would find this controversy
sufficient ground not to award punitive damages in a product
liability case.
C. Safety Concerns
The judge also should consider the claim that punitive damage
awards in product liability cases do. not further the goal of
improving product safety beyond what would be achieved by
imposing compensatory damages alone. Accident reduction is a
legitimate goal of tort liability in general, and product liability in
particular. Product suppliers have an economic incentive to reduce
the risks of their products, at least to the point where improving
Myth of the Ford Pinto Case, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 1013 (1991).
23. About half of U.S. jurisdictions do not permit insurability of punitive damages on
the basis that such insurance is against public policy. See, e.g., Northwestern Nat'l Casualty
Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432, 434-42 (5th Cir. 1962); St. Paul Surplus Lines Ins. Co. v.
International Playtex, Inc., 777 P.2d 1259, 1267-69 (Kan. 1989); Home Ins. Co. v. American
Home Products Corp., 550 N.E.2d 930, 935 (N.Y. 1990). See also 11 The Insurability of
Punitive Damages, The Risk Report (Sept. 1988 - Aug. 1989). A number of jurisdictions
permit insurance where punitive damages are imposed on the insured. See U.S. Concrete
Pipe Co. v. Bould, 437 So. 2d 1061, 1064 (Fla. 1983).
24. See, e.g., Michael C. Garrett, Comment, Allowance of Punitive Damages in
Products Liability Claims, 6 GA. L. REv. 613 (1971-1972); David AJ. Richards, Note, In
Defense of Punitive Damages, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 303 (1980).
25. See, e.g., Ausness, supra note 22; E. Donald Elliott, Why Punitive Damages Don't
Deter Corporate Misconduct Effectively, 40 ALA. L. REV. 1053 (1989).
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safety does not exceed accident costs, because, if they do not, they
will be found negligent 26 or their products will be found defec-
tive.27 Thus, it is appropriate for manufacturers to make con-
scious risk-benefit or cost-benefit analyses to determine the point
at which the cost of reducing product risks exceeds the costs of
paying for injury. If they err in their analyses, they must pay
compensation to the injured plaintiff The argument is that, in
order to avoid having to pay compensation, product suppliers
attempt to minimize the risks posed by their products and
accidents are reduced. Thus, the threat of liability in negligence
or strict liability is sufficient to encourage product suppliers to
reduce product risks to an acceptable level.
Sometimes, however, where a product with a significant but
reducible risk is highly profitable, the threat of punitive damages
does not hamper corporate decision-makers. As a result, decision-
makers may be tempted to tip the cost-benefit balance so as to
trade safety for profits. In such cases, the threat of compensatory
damages alone might not be enough to induce elimination or
reduction of the risk. Product suppliers may argue that the
unpredictability of punitive damages, with respect to when they
will be awarded and in what amount, has the effect of
overdeterrence by discouraging product suppliers from engaging in
appropriate cost-benefit decisions that optimize product safety.
That same unpredictability, however, may also serve to discourage
inappropriate cost-benefit decisions by cutting into the profits they
create.
The appellate judge researching this point would find that
courts generally have taken a dim view of conscious risk-taking by
manufacturers where the value of life and limb is a part of the
cost-benefit analysis. The court in Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., for
example, noted that "punitive damages may be particularly
appropriate in a product liability case because ... [s]ome may
think it cheaper toyay damages or a forfeiture than to change a
business practice." Similarly, in Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co.,
the court permitted a $3.5 million punitive damage award because
the defendant "decided to defer correction of the [Pinto's]
26. See, e.g., Exun v. General Electric Co., 819 F.2d 1158, 1162 (D.C. Cir. 1987);
United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 172-73 (2d Cir. 1947).
27. See, eg., Nichols v. Union Underwear Co., 602 S.W.2d 429 (Ky. 1980).
28. 294 N.W.2d 437, 451 (Wis. 1980).
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shortcomings by engaging in a cost-benefit analysis balancing
human lives and limbs against corporate profit."29
D. The Incompatibility of Punitive Damages and Strict Liability
Another criticism of punitive damages in product liability is
that the doctrine is incompatible with strict product liability. The
record in this case indicates that the plaintiff "filed a lawsuit on a
product liability theory." It is not clear, however, which of the
many possible product liability theories the plaintiff's attorney
chose. In a typical product liability lawsuit, the plaintiff proceeds
on theories of negligence, strict liability, and breach of implied
warranty. If strict liability is the basis of this case, the judge might
consider the argument that the at-fault basis of punitive damages
is inconsistent with the fault-free theory of strict liability. Liability
in a strict product liability case arises from a finding that the
product is defective, not from a finding of faulty conduct. On the
other hand, an award of punitive damages requires a finding of
extreme misconduct. 30  Thus, the theoretical foundations of strict
product liability and punitive damages liability are arguably
incompatible. A number of courts have addressed this incompati-
bility issue.3 Although an occasional court has reached a
different result,32 most have found no theoretical incompatibility
between punitive damages and strict liability. Rather, they have
concluded that as long as the plaintiff proves the requisite
misconduct to justify the award of punitive damages, the theory of
the underlying cause of action is irrelevant.3
29. Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757,813 (1981). But see Schwartz,
supra note 22 (suggesting that the court either misrepresented or misinterpreted Ford's
cost-benefit analysis).
30. For a discussion of standards for punitive damages, see Germanio v. Goodyear
Tire & Rubber Co., 732 F. Supp. 1297 (D.NJ. 1990); Leonen v. Johns-Manville Corp., 717
F. Supp. 272, 280-81 (D.N.J. 1989); Kociemba v. G.D. Searle & Co., 707 F. Supp. 1517,
1535-38 (D.C. Minn. 1989); Racich v. Celotex Corp., 887 F.2d 393, 399 (2d Cir. 1989).
31. See, e.g., Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. Day, 594 P.2d 38 (Alaska 1979); Grimshaw v.
Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, (1981); Palmer v. A.H. Robins Co., 684 P.2d 187,
217-19 (Colo. 1984); Piper Aircraft Corp. v. Coulter, 426 So. 2d 1108 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1983); Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 294 N.W.2d 437 (Wis. 1980).
32. See, e.g., Gold v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 553 F. Supp. 482,483 (D.NJ. 1981);
Butcher v. Robertshaw Controls Co., 550 F. Supp. 692, 705 (D.C. Md. 1981); Barnwell v.
Barber-Colman Co., 393 S.E.2d 162, 163 (S.C. 1989).
33. See, e.g., Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 394, 399-400 (5th Cir.
1986); Cathey v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 776 F.2d 1565,1569-70 (6th Cit. 1985); Sturm,
Ruger & Co. v. Day, 594 P.2d 38,46-49 (Alaska 1979), modified, 615 P.2d 621,623 (Alaska
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E. Potential Overpunishment
Finally, critics of punitive damages in product liability actions
often assert that the number of potential claims against a single
corporate defendant results in overpunishment, which may lead to
adverse social and economic consequences. This scenario arises in
product liability where a corporate entity may, through a single
course of conduct, put a dangerous product on the market with the
potential for injuring hundreds, or even thousands, of people far
into the future. If the misconduct is sufficient to justify an award
of punitive damages, the potential for multiple punishment is
obvious. Based on the nature of the misconduct and the wealth of
the defendant, the jury in the first product liability case presum-
ably will award an amount sufficient to communicate to the
defendant the error of its ways. Nothing, however, will prevent
later juries, in actions based on the same conduct, from subjecting
the defendant to additional assessments of punitive damages. In
Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc.,' an early case considering
the propriety of awarding punitive damages in product liability
cases, the court expressed grave doubts about whether "claims for
punitive damages in such a multiplicity of actions throughout the
nation can be so administered as to avoid overkill."35
The "overkill" problem is particularly troubling in cases where
the corporate defendant's past misconduct in putting a dangerous
product on the market has created the potential for numerous
injuries that extends far into the future. That, however, is not the
situation in the MegaFood case. Although numerous lawsuits
arising out of coffee burns have been filed in the past decade, the
potential for future lawsuits does not depend upon MegaFood's
misconduct in the past because injuries based on past misconduct
already have occurred. Rather, future lawsuits depend upon its
future misconduct. If MegaFood cures the product defect by
1980), on reh'g., 627 P.2d 204, 205 (Alaska), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894 (1981); Palmer v.
A.H. Robins Co., 684 P.2d 187,213-14 (Colo. 1984); Masaki v. General Motors Corp., 780
P.2d 566, 568 (Haw. 1989); Fischer v. Johns-Manville Corp., 512 A.2d 466, 470-72 (N.J.
1986).
34. 378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1967). This case involved the drug MER/29, developed to
lower blood cholesterol levels. The manufacturer of the drug knew that it caused users
to develop cataracts yet continued to market it with no warning as to its potential ill
effects. Id. at 834-36.
35. Id. at 839.
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changing its corporate coffee policy, either by lowering the
temperature of the coffee or by providing adequate warnings to
customers of the risks posed by the coffee, its exposure to punitive
damages will cease. Thus, while a judge reviewing the award of
punitive damages in the MegaFood case would no doubt recognize
the validity of the "overkill" criticism of punitive damages, the
judge would also recognize that it is not applicable to the case.
F Conclusions Regarding the Criticisms
Although the particular difficulties posed by permitting
punitive damage awards may be a matter of concern, it is unlikely
that a judge would consider them sufficient reason to conclude that
punitive damages should never be permitted in a product liability
case. That conclusion, however, does not end the judge's prelimi-
nary inquiries in this case. Numerous challenges to punitive
damages in product liability cases have been based on constitu-
tional grounds. Thus, the judge also must consider whether there
are constitutional concerns that would impede a punitive damages
award in product liability cases generally and, if not, whether there
are constitutional restrictions that would preclude, or require
reduction of, the award in this case.
V. CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
A. Introduction
A variety of constitutional attacks have been waged against
punitive damages, including claims that punitive damages in
product liability violate constitutional protections against double
jeopardy and excessive fines, as well as constitutional rights to
procedural and substantive due process. For the most part,
however, demands for constitutional restraints on punitive
damages have been unsuccessful. The U.S. Supreme Court has
specifically rejected challenges to punitive damages based on
claims that they violate prohibitions against double jeopardy36
and constitute excessive fines.37 The extent, however, to which
36. The Supreme Court has stated that "protections of the Double Jeopardy clause
are not triggered by litigation between private parties." United States v. Halper, 490 U.S.
435, 451 (1989).
37. In Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257 (1989), the Court
held that the excessive fines clause was intended to curb only governmental action and,
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due process requirements may limit punitive damages is less clear.
While the Supreme Court has indicated that due process may place
restraints on punitive damages,"8 it so far has declined to impose
specific limitations on most due process grounds. With the matter
in doubt, both procedural and substantive due process challenges
persist.
B. Procedural Due Process
As to procedural due process, defendants have made a variety
of claims. They frequently have asserted that the standards used
at trial to determine an award are too vague to adequately guide
the jury, particularly when no statutory provision exists to limit the
amount of punitive damages that may be awarded.39  The thrust
of such arguments is that standards of conduct used to determine
punitive damages, such as "wanton" or "reckless," do not provide
the jury with constitutionally sufficient guidance in determining
what kind of behavior merits an award of punitive damages or how
much the amount of the award should be. Responding to such
arguments, some courts have concluded that the traditional
standards for determining the propriety of punitive damages are
not sufficiently vague to offend due process.' Others have
refused to hold common law standards unconstitutional because
imposition of a uniform standard "is best left to Congress or for
higher judicial authority."
41
thus, does not limit the award of punitive damages to private parties in civil actions. Id.
at 258.
Courts have taken the same approach where defendants have challenged state
constitutional excessive fines provisions. See, e.g., King v. Armstrong World Indus., 906
F.2d 1022 (5th Cir. 1990) (applying Texas law); Germanio v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,
732 F. Supp. 1297, 1304 (D.N.J. 1990) (applying New Jersey law).
38. In Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257 (1989), the
Supreme Court declined to consider the question of whether the due process clause limits
punitive damages. All nine justices, however, expressed concern over the due process
issue, and some specifically indicated that they might look favorably upon a challenge to
punitive damages in product liability cases. 492 U.S. at 276.
39. See, e.g., Germanio v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 732 F. Supp. 1297 (D.NJ.
1990).
40. See, e.g., id.; Leonen v. Johns-Manville Corp., 717 F. Supp. 272, 280-81 (D.N.J.
1989); Kociemba v. G.D. Searle & Co., 707 F. Supp. 1517, 1535-38 (D.C. Minn. 1989).
41. Racich v. Celotex Corp., 887 F.2d 393, 399 (2d Cir. 1989).
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1. Undue Jury Discretion
Although it has not established rules or guidelines in this area,
the U.S. Supreme Court has rejected a procedural due process
challenge to punitive damages based on claims of insufficient
guidance and undue jury discretion. In Pacific Mutual Life
Insurance Co. v. Haslip,4 the Court refused to rule that the
Alabama common law method of determining punitive damages,
which included instructing the jury on the purposes of punitive
damages and providing a multifactor test for trial court review of
punitive damages, violated due process. While the Court conceded
that unlimited discretion might "jar one's constitutional sensibili-
ties," it nevertheless concluded that no "bright line between the
constitutionally acceptable and the constitutionally unaccept-
able"'43 could be drawn to fit every case. It further noted that
"general concerns of reasonableness and adequate guidance from
the court when the case is tried to a jury properly enter into the
constitutional calculus."'
2. Excessive Awards
As to the issue of excessive awards, the Court in TXO
Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp.4' refused to hold
that a punitive damage award over five hundred times greater than
the compensatory award violated procedural due process. The
defendant asserted that its due process rights were violated
because it had no advance notice that the jury might be allowed to
return such a large award. The Supreme Court responded that the
notice requirement of the due process clause is satisfied "if prior
law fairly indicated that a punitive damages award might be
imposed in response to egregiously tortious conduct."' Addition-
ally, the Court refused to address the defendant's claim that the
jury should not have been instructed that it could consider the
defendant's financial position in assessing punitive damages
because the issue had not been properly preserved. Instead, the
42. 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
43. Id. at 18.
44. Id. at 2. With this in mind, the Court looked to whether the Alabama procedures
for awarding punitive damages provided sufficient objective criteria for the jury and trial
court and concluded that they did. I& at 20-22.
45. 113 S. Ct. 2711, 2724 (1993).
46. I&
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Court noted that in Pacific Mutual it had cited the financial
position of the defendant as a factor that could be taken into
account in determining punitive damage&
4
In Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, the lone product liability
case involving punitive damages decided by the Supreme Court,
the Court held that a provision in the Oregon Constitution
permitting only very limited judicial review of the amount of
punitive damages awarded by a jury violated due process.49
Noting that "[j]udicial review of the size of punitive damage
awards has been a safeguard against excessive verdicts for as long
as punitive damages have been awarded,"' the Court examined
the history of judicial review of punitive damage awards and
concluded that the scope of review permitted in Oregon differed
dramatically from the scope under the common law. Unlike the
common law, the Oregon procedure provided no assurance that
punitive damages would not be arbitrary. According to the Court,
due process does not permit the state to commit the decision on
the amount of punitive damages to the unreviewable discretion of
a jury. Thus, state procedures must include trial court review of
the amount of the award. The Court, however, did not address
what it considered "the more difficult question of what standard
of review is constitutionally required."51
3. Burden of Proof
The penal nature of punitive damage awards has given rise to
claims that due process requires use of a more stringent burden of
proof, such as "clear and convincing evidence," rather than the
47. Id. at 2722.
48. 114 S. Ct. 2331, 2346-47 (1994).
49. The amended Article VII, § 3 of the Oregon Constitution provided:
In actions at law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the
right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury shall be
otherwise re-examined in any court of this State, unless the court can affirmative-
ly say there is no evidence to support the verdict.
OR. CONST. art. VII, § 3 (amended 1995).
50. 114 S. Ct. at 2335.
51. Id. at 2341 n.10. The Court, however, did give some indication that a variety of
standards might be acceptable. The Court said:
Although courts adopting a more deferential approach use different verbal
formulations, there may not be much practical difference between review which
focuses on "passion and prejudice," "gross excessiveness," or whether the verdict
was "against the great weight of the evidence."
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"preponderance of the evidence" burden traditionally used in civil
cases." Numerous jurisdictions have raised the standard of proof
for punitive damage awards to "clear and convincing evidence,"
either by judicial opinion53 or by statute,54 and the Supreme
Court in Oberg recognized it as "an important check against
unwarranted imposition of punitive damages."'55 Nevertheless, no
court has held that this higher standard is constitutionally required,
nor has any court concluded that procedural due process consider-
ations require bifurcation of the trial.56
C Substantive Due Process
1. Multiple Awards Against a Single Defendant
The most frequently asserted substantive due process
complaint against punitive damages in the product liability context
is the potential for multiple punitive damage awards against a
single defendant for conduct relating to a single product. Closely
related to the "overkill" argument previously discussed,57 the
claim in due process terms is that the aggregate of all potential
punitive damage awards arising out of a single course of conduct
will result in a punishment grossly disproportionate to the
misconduct. This result, arguably, is at odds with the concept of
fundamental fairness inherent in the notion of substantive due
process.58 Although courts have not denied punitive damages on
substantive due process grounds, their approaches to the issue
have varied. Some have treated the problem as raising only
procedural due process issues and have found the trial court
affords procedural safeguards that sufficiently provide due pro-
52. See, e.g., Glasscock v. Armstrong Cork Co., 946 F.2d 1085, 1099 (5th Cir. 1991),
cert. denied, 503 U.S. 1011 (1992); Simpson v. Pittsburgh Coming Corp., 901 F.2d 277, 282
(2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1057 (1990).
53. See, e.g., Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 294 N.W.2d 437, 458 (Wis. 1980).
54. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-34-2 (West 1990); MoNT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-
221(5) (1987).
55. 114 S. Ct. at 2341.
56. In jurisdictions employing the bifurcated trial, liability issues are presented at the
first stage and punitive damage issues are considered at the second.
57. See supra Part IV.E.
58. See, e.g., Simpson v. Pittsburgh Coming Corp., 901 F.2d 277 (2d Cir. 1990), cerL
denied, 497 U.S. 1057 (1990); Johnson v. Celotex Corp., 899 F.2d 1281 (2d Cir. 1990); cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 920 (1990); Tetuan v. A.H. Robins Co., 738 P.2d 1210 (Kan. 1987).
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cess.59 Others have disposed of the issue by concluding that the
defendant's conduct did not constitute a single course of con-
duct.6° At least one court has held that multiple punitive damage
awards in mass tort or product liability litigation violate due
process, 61 though it vacated this ruling on reconsideration because
of the inability to fashion a workable remedy.62 The court
reluctantly concluded that "[u]ntil there is uniformity either
through Supreme Court decision or national legislation, this court
is powerless to fashion a remedy which will protect the due process
rights of this defendant or other defendants similarly situated."'
2. When an Award Constitutes a Taking
Defendants also have claimed that either an excessive punitive
damages award or a large disparity between the compensatory
damage award and the punitive damage award constitutes a taking
of property without due process and exceeds the substantive limits
for penalties imposed by due process. Such an argument was
made by the defendant in TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance
Resources Corp.," in which the jury awarded punitive damages
greatly in excess of the compensatory award. The Supreme Court,
examining the award with "reasonableness in mind," determined
that it could not say "that the award was so 'grossly excessive' as
to be beyond the power of the State to allow." In Honda
Motor Co. v. Oberg,67 although the Supreme Court treated the
issue of judicial review of the amount of punitive damage awards
as an issue of procedural due process, the Court specifically stated:
Our recent cases have recognized that the Constitution imposes
a substantive limit on the size of punitive damage awards.
59. See, e.g., Cathey v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 776 F.2d 1565, 1571 (6th Cir. 1985)
cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1021 (1986); Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 294 N.W.2d 437, 466 (Wis.
1980).
60. See, e.g., Simpson v. Pittsburgh Coming Corp., 901 F.2d 277, 281 (2d Cir. 1990),
cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1057 (1990); Puppe v. A.C. & S., Inc., 733 F. Supp. 1355, 1361
(D.N.D. 1990); Tetuan, 738 P2d at 1245.
61. Juzwin v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 705 F. Supp 1053, 1065 (D.NJ. 1989); but see
Loenen v. Johns-Manville Corp., 717 F. Supp. 272, (D.NJ. 1989).
62. Juzwin v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 718 F. Supp. 1233, 1234 (D.NJ. 1989).
63. Id. at 1235.
64. 113 S. Ct. 2711 (1993).
65. Id. at 2720.
66. Id. at 2723.
67. 114 S. Ct. 2331 (1994).
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[citations omitted] Although they fail to "draw a mathematical
bright line between the constitutionally acceptable and the
constitutionally unacceptable," [citations omitted] a minority of
the Justices agreed that the Due Process Clause imposes a limit
on punitive damages.8
The Court, however, noted that the case did not require consider-
ation of "the character of the standard that will identify unconsti-
tutionally excessive awards." 69
3. Conclusions Regarding Substantive Due Process
Although it appears unlikely that the U.S. Supreme Court will
provide further guidance in the way of specific procedures or
substantive criteria essential to satisfy due process, the response of
the Oregon Supreme Court to the U.S. Supreme Court's holding
in Oberg may be instructive to the judge reviewing the punitive
damage award in Smith v. MegaFood. On remand, the Oregon
Supreme Court stated that "[t]here is a range of punitive damages
that a reasonable jury may assess in a given case, and an assess-
ment of damages that exceeds that range results in a deprivation
of property that is a substantive due process violation."'7 The
Court devised a standard of review for post-verdict judicial review
that required "the award of punitive damages [to be] within the
range that a rational juror would be entitled to award in light of
the record as a whole." The court, nevertheless, concluded that,
given the record in the case, a $5 million punitive damage award
against a company with $4.9 billion in assets where the compensa-
tory award was $900,000 was not grossly excessive.
VI. REVIEW OF THE MEGAFOOD PuNmIIvE DAMAGE AWARD
Although nothing in the constitutional caselaw suggests that
the award of punitive damages against MegaFood is per se
unconstitutional, the MegaFood appellate judge nonetheless must
consider constitutional issues. Additionally, the judge will be
68. Id. at 2335.
69. Id
70. Oberg v. Honda Motor Co., 888 P.2d 8, 11 (Or. 1995).
71. Id at 12. For a more extensive discussion of the standard, see Germanio v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 732 F. Supp. 1297 (D.N.J. 1990); Leonen v. Johns-Manville
Corp., 717 F. Supp. 272, 280-81 (D.NJ. 1989); Kociemba v. G.D. Searle & Co., 707 F.
Supp. 1517, 1535-38 (D.C. Minn. 1989); Racich v. Celotex Corp., 887 F.2d 393, 399 (2d Cir.
1989).
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affected by, and thus must consider, the current political climate.
Because MegaFood is a product liability case wherein punitive
damages were assessed against a U.S. corporation, tort reformers
and consumer advocates alike will closely scrutinize the case. With
all of this in mind, the judge must set about the dual task of
determining whether an award of punitive damages was justified
in this case and, if so, whether the amount awarded should be
reduced.
A. Standards for the Jury
To that end, the judge will review carefully the record from
the trial court. One of the judge's primary concerns is the
standard the jury used to evaluate MegaFood's conduct. Defen-
dants challenging punitive damage awards regularly have claimed
that the standards used at trial for determining both the propriety
and amount of awards are too vague or are inadequate to guide
the jury, particularly when nothing limits the amount of damages
that may be awarded.'
U.S. courts generally have agreed that punitive damages in
tort cases should only be awarded where the character of the
conduct and the defendant's mental state had an outrageous
quality. Terms such as fraud, malice, intent to injure, reckless
indifference to safety, willful misconduct, wantonness, and
conscious misconduct all have been used to describe the kind of
conduct that justifies punitive damages.'3 According to the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, "[p]unitive damages may be
awarded for conduct that is outrageous, because of the defendant's
evil motive or his reckless indifference to the rights of others."74
Obviously, in the product liability context, a finding of
outrageous conduct will rarely, if ever, be based on evil motive or
an actual intent to injure. Nevertheless, in product liability cases
involving punitive damage claims, courts typically have not
modified the language of the standards used in torts cases to fit the
product manufacturing and marketing setting. Instead, courts have
changed the meaning of the words to fit the product liability
72. See, e.g., Germanio v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 732 F. Supp. 1297, 1302
(D.NJ. 1990).
73. See, e.g., W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS § 34, at 212-14 (5th ed. 1984); James D. Ghiardi & John J. Kircher, PUNrTIvE
DAMAGES L. & PRAC. § 5.01. (Cum. Supp. 1994).
74. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 908(2) (1965).
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context. Thus, courts in jurisdictions requiring a finding of
"malice" for a punitive damage award have held that the concept
of malice includes not only actual ill will but also a reckless or
conscious indifference to the potential for serious injury.7" One
court wrote:
We believe that in products liability cases the equivalent of
the "evil motive," "intent to defraud," or "intent to injure,"
which generally characterizes "actual malice," is actual knowl-
edge of the defect and deliberate disregard of the consequences.
Therefore, in order for actual malice to be found in a products
liability case, regardless of whether the cause of action for
compensatory damages is based on negligence or strict liability,
the plaintiff must prove (1) actual knowledge of the defect on
the part of the defendant, and (2) the defendant's conscious or
deliberate disregard of the foreseeable harm resulting from the
defect.76
B. The Owen Factors
In 1976, Professor David Owen wrote the first significant
scholarly consideration of the role of punitive damages in product
liability actions. He suggested that the standard for determining
the appropriateness of punitive damages in product liability cases
should ask whether the defendant has demonstrated "a flagrant
indifference to the public safety."'  To ascertain whether the
defendant's conduct rose to this level, Professor Owen recom-
mended using the following factors:
(1) the magnitude of the danger to the public;
(2) the cost and feasibility of reducing the danger to an
acceptable level;
(3) the manufacturer's awareness of the danger, of the magni-
tude of the danger, and of the availability of a feasible remedy;
(4) the nature and duration of, and the reasons for, the
manufacturer's failure to act appropriately to discover or to
reduce the danger; and
(5) the extent to which the manufacturer purposefully created
the danger.78
75. See, eg., Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 786-88 (1981);
Tratchel v. Essex Group, Inc., 452 N.W.2d 171, 175-76 (Iowa 1990).
76. Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobia, 601 A2d 633, 653 (Md. 1992).
77. Owen, supra note 17, at 1368.
78. Id. at 1369.
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Although U.S. courts rarely have identified the above factors so
specifically, most courts actually do require proof of some
combination of these factors to sustain a punitive damages award
in a product liability case.
The Smith v. MegaFood record does not reveal what standard
of conduct the trial court used or how the judge instructed the jury
with respect to the standard. For the purposes of this Article, I
will assume that the jury was instructed to award punitive damages
only if it found that MegaFood's conduct displayed a "flagrant
indifference to public safety."79 I will assume further that the
judge instructed the jury to consider the above factors in determin-
ing whether MegaFood's conduct met that standard.
The first two factors, the magnitude of the danger to the
public and the cost and feasibility of reducing the danger to an
acceptable level, do not speak directly to the nature of the
defendant's conduct. Nevertheless, I will address them first
because rarely, if ever, are punitive damages justified in a product
liability context if the product does not pose a significant danger
to the public or if the cost or feasibility of reducing the danger is
prohibitive.
1. The Magnitude of the Risk
To determine the magnitude of the risk, the appellate judge
must look both to the severity of the potential injury and to the
likelihood that it will occur. The trial court found that
MegaFood's policy was to keep liquid at a temperature that causes
third degree burns within two to seven seconds. Since third degree
bums are extremely painful and cause permanent disfigurement
and lengthy disability, the severity of the potential injury is
unquestionable.
At first glance, the "likelihood" that a person will be burned
by MegaFood's coffee seems low. MegaFood sells millions of cups
of coffee a year, and only a fraction of those have resulted in
severe bums. Nevertheless, the marketing methods employed by
MegaFood increase the likelihood of coffee spills. MegaFood's
marketing techniques actively encourage drive-through customers,
and a large percentage of the millions of cups of coffee sold by
MegaFood each year are sold at drive-through windows. Despite
79. Id. at 1368.
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the risk involved with drinking very hot beverages in a moving
automobile, doing so is common practice among Americans
While only a small percentage of MegaFood coffee sales have
resulted in severe bums, seven hundred fifty lawsuits have been
filed nationwide for severe burns from coffee spills in the last ten
years. These statistics indicate that coffee spills occur with some
regularity and, thus, pose a significant hazard on a national scale.
In light of the seriousness of potential injuries and the regularity
with which the injuries have occurred nationwide, a judge
reviewing Smith v. MegaFood reasonably could conclude that a
jury could have found the magnitude of the risk to be significant.
2. The Cost and Feasibility of Reducing the Danger
Although the cost and feasibility of reducing the danger to an
acceptable level sometimes are difficult to determine in a product
liability case, they are relatively easy to assess in Smith v. MegaFo-
od. MegaFood had two alternatives. First, it could have altered
the "design" of its product by reducing the temperature of its
coffee. Because this "design" change would require only that
MegaFood inform its company store managers and franchisees of
a change in the corporate policy on coffee temperature, this
alternative does not appear to be costly.
Arguably, however, the "design" alternative would not be cost
free. The record states that most consumers prefer their coffee at
180 degrees Fahrenheit, and that MegaFood's competitors serve
their coffee at a temperature fifteen to twenty percent cooler.
Thus, MegaFood may have gained a competitive advantage by
serving its coffee at the temperature most consumers prefer.
Although the record does not indicate that MegaFood conducted
market studies to determine the extent of that advantage, the jury
may have assumed the advantage of serving hotter coffee to be
significant. Thus, the jury could conclude that while a change in
coffee "design" was feasible, it may have been costly in terms of
corporate profits.80
As an alternative to changing the temperature of its coffee,
MegaFood could have provided adequate warnings about the risks
80. Putting consumers at risk in order to maximize profits has not been viewed
favorably by courts. Whether such a consideration is appropriate will be discussed under
Owen's fourth factor. See infra Part VI.B.4.
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posed by coffee spills. Although some scholars disagree,"'
providing adequate warnings of product risks generally is consid-
ered to be a low cost method of curing a product defect.
MegaFood, at little actual cost, could have posted signs at its drive-
through windows, in its restaurants, and even on its cups, warning
that the coffee was hot enough to cause serious burns if spilled.
As with the "design" alternative, the impact of such a warning
on coffee sales is difficult to assess accurately. If MegaFood's
consumers actually prefer their coffee very hot, it is unlikely that
many would decide to purchase coffee elsewhere in order to avoid
the risk of injury. On the other hand, if these consumers patronize
MegaFood for reasons other than the temperature of the coffee,
they may be more likely to go elsewhere. Because we have no
information on the motivation of MegaFood coffee customers, the
real cost of adequate warnings is difficult to assess. Lacking this
information, a jury reasonably could have concluded that warnings
in this case were feasible and that they may or may not have been
costly.
3. MegaFood's Awareness of the Danger
Using Professor Owen's factors, once the jury established that
the magnitude of the risk is great and the cost of reducing it to an
acceptable level is minimal, it would look to the product supplier's
awareness of the danger, its magnitude, and the availability of a
feasible remedy.' This phase looks at the blameworthiness of
the defendant's conduct. To justify a conclusion that the conduct
in question exhibited a "flagrant indifference for public safety,"
courts generally have required that the product manufacturer had
knowledge of the hazard and its potential for harm.
Ordinarily, evidence that the defendant was aware of prior
incidents, which resulted in the same kind of injury suffered by the
plaintiff in the present case, satisfies the knowledge require-
ment.83 Courts disagree on whether the defendant's knowledge
must be actual or whether constructive knowledge suffices.
81. See James A. Henderson & Aaron D. Twerski, Doctrinal Collapse in Products
Liability: The Empty Shell of Failure to Warn, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 265, 296-98 (1990).
82. Owen, supra note 17, at 1369.
83. See, e.g., Tetuan v. A. H. Robins Co., 738 P.2d 1210, 1224-25 (Kan. 1987). But see
Loitz v. Remington Arms Co., 563 N.E.2d 397, 417-19 (I11. 1990) (finding evidence of
ninety-four previous incidents reported to defendant was insufficient to establish actual
knowledge).
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Although most courts have required actual knowledge, some
have taken the approach suggested in the Restatement (Second)
of Torts. The Restatement permits punitive damages where the
defendant has "reason to know'" of the risk posed by the
product but no actual knowledge.' A few courts have suggested
that punitive damages may be assessed in cases in which the
defendant's conduct was simply negligent, such as when the
defendant "should have known" of the danger posed by the
product.' For a jury to conclude, however, that a defendant
84. For example, the Maryland Court of Appeals in Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobia
stated:
The knowledge component, which we hold is necessary to support an award of
punitive damages, does not mean "constructive knowledge" or "substantial
knowledge" or "should have known." More is required to expose a defendant
to a potential punitive damages award. The plaintiff must show that the
defendant actually knew of the defect and of the danger of the product at the
time the product left the defendant's possession or control.
601 A.2d 633, 653-54 (Md. 1992) (emphasis in original). See also Mosser v. Freuhauf
Corp., 940 F.2d 77, 85 (4th Cir. 1991); Sealover v. Carey Canada, 793 F. Supp. 569 (M.D.
Pa. 1992); Lane v. Amsted Indus., 779 S.W.2d 754, 758 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989); School
District v. U.S. Gypsum, 750 S.W.2d 442,444-46 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988).
85. Comment b of § 908 refers to § 500 which states:
The actor's conduct is in reckless disregard of the safety of another if he does an
act or intentionally fails to do an act which it is his duty to the other to do,
knowing or having reason to know of facts which would lead a reasonable man
to realize, not only that his conduct creates-an unreasonable risk of physical harm
to another, but also that such risk is substantially greater than that which is
necessary to make his conduct negligent.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 (1965). Section 12 of the Restatement defines
"reason to know" as "information from which a person of reasonable intelligence or of the
superior intelligence of the actor would infer that the fact in question exists, or that such
person would govern his conduct upon the assumption that such fact exists." Id. § 12.
86. See, e.g., Acosta v. Honda Motor Co., 717 F.2d 828, 841-44 (3d Cir. 1983);
Catasauqua Area Sch. Dist. v. Raymark Indus., 662 F. Supp. 64, 65-66, 69-70 (E.D. Pa.
1987); Wooderson v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 681 P.2d 1038, 1049-50, 1058 (Kan.
1984).
87. In Loudermill v. Dow Chemical Co., 863 F.2d 566 (8th Cit. 1988), in which a
worker suffered injuries from chemical exposure, the court stated that "[i]nferred malice
requires that the defendant knew or should have known of the potential harm, but
proceeded anyway with conscious indifference to the possibility of injury." Id at 571
(emphasis added). Because the court in Loudermill concluded that the defendant had
actual knowledge of the danger posed by its product, it is not evident what the court
would have found sufficient to satisfy a "should have known" requirement. Id.
See also Bryant v. Muskin Co., 873 F.2d 714, 715 (4th Cir. 1989) (finding it is not
always necessary that particular defendant realize he is invading the rights of another if
a person of ordinary prudence would come to that realization); Johnson v. Colt Indus.
Operating Corp., 797 F.2d 1530, 1533-36 (10th Cir. 1986) (finding from an early date that
the industry was or should have been aware of risk of drop-fire).
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displayed "flagrant indifference to public safety"8' where the
defendant was simply negligent in being unaware of the danger,
seems inappropriate.
In Smith v. MegaFood, even if the judge requires actual
knowledge to allow the imposition of punitive damages on
MegaFood, punitive damages may be justified. Over the past de-
cade, MegaFood has been sued by hundreds of people because of
coffee burn injuries. Thus, MegaFood would be hard pressed to
claim that it did not have actual knowledge of the risk and its
magnitude. Additionally, MegaFood had two feasible, though not
necessarily low cost, options to reduce the risk. It could have
lowered the coffee temperature or provided an adequate warning.
MegaFood chose to do neither.
4. The Reasons Behind MegaFood's Failure to Reduce the
Danger
While knowledge or some degree of awareness of the danger
is necessary for an award of punitive damages, it alone is usually
insufficient to sustain the award. Professor Owen's fourth factor
also must be satisfied. This factor addresses "the nature and
duration of, and the reasons for the manufacturer's failure to act
appropriately to discover or to reduce the danger."8 9 Thus, what
the defendant did or failed to do in the face of the known risk, as
well as the defendant's motives for its action or inaction, also are
relevant in determining whether the character of its conduct
justifies the imposition of punitive damages. The record indicates
that, in the face of knowledge that its coffee was causing serious
injuries to consumers and that consumers were unaware of these
risks, for at least ten years MegaFood failed to alter the "design"
of its coffee or to warn consumers of the risks. Failure both to
redesign a product 9° and to inform potential product users of
88. Owen, supra note 17, at 1368.
89. Id. at 1369.
90. See, e.g., Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. Day, 594 P.2d 38,46 (Alaska 1979), modified on
other grounds, 615 P2d 621 (Alaska 1980); Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App.
3d 757, 807-10 (1981); Gryc v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 297 N.W.2d 727, 739 (Minn. 1980).
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known dangers, once the danger is known,91 has influenced some
courts to impose punitive damages.
The important question becomes why a product supplier has
elected not to redesign or to warn. For example, the reason for
not redesigning may be perfectly acceptable. Presumably, design
decisions are made only after balancing the burden of redesigning
against the benefits, in the face of anticipated risks. A change in
design that would reduce the risk also might impair the utility of
the product or make the product too expensive to be marketable.
The decision to market a product in spite of its risks is an
economic one that product suppliers are expected to make. The
fact that a product supplier is motivated to maintain a riskier
design by a desire to make a profit should not be sufficient in itself
to justify punitive damages. Thus, courts should proceed cau-
tiously where the only evidence favoring the imposition of punitive
damages is the defendant's knowledge of the risk and a decision
to preserve the original design of the product due to factors of
marketability and profit.
Some manufacturers, however, go beyond a healthy
consideration of economics, and become fixated on profit margins
despite the dangerousness of their products. Courts have not
hesitated to impose punitive damages on defendants who go to
extremes to maximize corporate profits at the expense of safety.'
Thus, where a product design proves far more dangerous than
anticipated, and design changes are feasible, a court may be
justified in concluding that the failure to redesign is evidence of "a
flagrant indifference to safety,"'93 particularly where the decision
not to redesign was prompted by greed.'
Courts respond similarly to companies who fail to warn
customers of a known risk out of greed." In MegaFood's case,
it probably did not change the temperature of its coffee in order
to maintain its competitive edge over other fast-food chains.
Although the decision not to change its "design" probably would
91. See, e.g., Tratchel v. Essex Group, Inc., 452 N.W.2d 171 (Iowa 1990); Fischer v.
Johns-Manville Corp., 512 A.2d 466, 480 (N.J. 1986); Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp. v.
Watson, 413 S.E.2d 630, 642 (Va. 1992); Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 294 N.W.2d 437, 462
(1980).
92. Grinshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d at 813.
93. Owen, supra note 17, at 1368.
94. See, e.g., Gryc v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 297 N.W.2d at 740.
95. See, e.g., Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 294 N.W.2d 437, 449-51 (Wis. 1980).
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not justify imposition of punitive damages, MegaFood also decided
not to provide warnings about the risk. The two decisions taken
together, as well as the motivation behind the decisions, present a
strong case for punitive damages. Thus, a judge reviewing the
punitive damages award here would find evidence from which a
jury could have concluded that MegaFood's conduct was particu-
larly blameworthy.
5. Did MegaFood Create the Danger?
The final factor in determining whether conduct demonstrates
a "flagrant indifference to public safety"' is "the extent to which
the manufacturer purposefully created the danger."'  Although
MegaFood had no intent to injure consumers with its coffee,
MegaFood made conscious decisions to keep its coffee at a
dangerous temperature and not to inform consumers of that fact.
Additionally, although MegaFood could claim that the coffee
would not spill if handled with reasonable care and, therefore, it
did not create the accidents, MegaFood marketed the coffee in a
way that made spills inevitable.
C. The Excessiveness of the Amount of the Award
Based on all of the above factors, the MegaFood appellate
judge reasonably could conclude that a jury could have found
MegaFood's conduct exhibited a "flagrant indifference to public
safety."" Thus, an award of punitive damages was justified
according to the Owen factors. That conclusion, however, does
not end the judge's responsibility in reviewing the case. Once the
judge has decided that the jury could have found that the defen-
dant displayed a "flagrant indifference to public safety,"" thus
justifying an award of punitive damages, the judge must determine
if the amount of the award was excessive.
The judge's decision as to the excessiveness of the damages is
perhaps the most difficult issue, in light of the contemporary
corporate outcry against punitive damages in product liability
cases. This outcry is prompted by the perception that juries,
moved by sympathy for injured consumers and by prejudice
96. Owen, supra note 17, at 1368.
97. Id. at 1369.
98. Id. at 1368.
99. Id.
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against corporations, frequently assess punitive damages in
excessive amounts.
Despite this current concern, determining the amount of
punitive damages traditionally has been, and remains, left to the
discretion of the jury. The amount awarded is based on the jury's
evaluation of the blameworthiness of the defendant's conduct and
its assessment of how much money it will take to punish the
defendant and to deter future misconduct by the defendant and
others.
1. The Blameworthiness of MegaFood
As to the nature of MegaFood's conduct, ample evidence
shows that MegaFood had notice that serious injuries could result
from the temperature of its coffee. In the face of this knowledge,
MegaFood, motivated by profits, refused to change its coffee
policy or to warn consumers. Thus, the jury could have concluded
that the defendant's conduct was highly blameworthy.
2. "Stinging MegaFood"
The record is silent with respect to what amount of money it
would take to "sting" the defendant sufficiently and to deter it and
others from similar misconduct in the future. No evidence of
MegaFood's wealth was introduced at trial. The record does state
that MegaFood is "the world's largest fast food chain," but it
contains no information about MegaFood's net worth. We can
assume, however, that the jury was aware that "the world's largest
fast food chain" would have an extremely large net worth. Given
MegaFood's wealth, the appellate judge may not see the jury's
award of $3.5 million as excessive.
Ordinarily, evidence of the defendant's wealth is introduced
in order to help the jury determine how much it will take to
"sting" the defendant. In fact, a few states, most notably Califor-
nia, require evidence of the defendant's wealth on the theory that
the information is necessary for appellate review of excessiveness
claims."° Critics claim that such evidence encourages juries to
vent their ire against big corporations by awarding huge punitive
damage awards. Thus, on appeal, the reviewing judge for
MegaFood also should determine whether the jury's punitive
100. See, eg., Adams v. Murakami, 813 P.2d 1348, 1351 (Cal. 1991).
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damage award was motivated by inappropriate factors such as
sympathy for the plaintiff or prejudice against the defendant.
The Supreme Court's decision in Honda Motor Co. v.
Oberg,'01 requiring post-verdict review by trial courts, allows us
to assume that the trial court already conducted a post-verdict
review of this award. Thus, the appellate judge in MegaFood will
be the second judge to review the excessiveness of the punitive
damage award.
D. Guidance From the Supreme Court
The record contains no information about the standard the
trial court might have used in reviewing the award in this case. In
Oberg, the Supreme Court did not specifically address the question
of what standard a trial court should apply in reviewing the
amount of a punitive damage award. Nevertheless, the Court
provided some guidance. In rejecting the plaintiff's argument that
Oregon provided adequate post-verdict review, the Court stated:
"What we are concerned with is the possibility that a guilty
defendant may be unjustly punished; evidence of guilt warranting
some punishment is not a substitute for evidence providing at least
a rational basis for the particular deprivation of property imposed
by the State to deter future wrongdoing."'" Moreover, in a
footnote the Court stated:
This case does not pose the more difficult question of what
standard of review is constitutionally required. Although courts
adopting a more deferential approach used different verbal
formulations, there may not be much practical difference
between review which focuses on "passion and prejudice,"
"gross excessiveness," or whether the verdict was "against the
great weight of the evidence." All of these may be rough
equivalents of the standard this Court articulated in Jackson v.
Virginia, (citation omitted) [which discussed] whether "no
rational trier of fact could have" reached the same verdict."3
Based on the above quote, the Oregon Supreme Court
devised the following standard for post-verdict review:
101. 114 S. Ct. 2331 (1994). In this decision the Supreme Court considered evidence
that showed that jurors are likely to grant inappropriate awards against wealthy
defendants. Id. at 2340.
102. I& at 2339.
103. 1& at 2341 n.10.
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A jury's award of punitive damages shall not be disturbed when
it is within the range that a rational juror would be entitled to
award in the light of the record as a whole; the range that a
rational juror would be entitled to award depends, in turn, on
the statutory and common law factors that allow an award of
punitive damages for the specific kind of claim at issue."4
We can assume that the MegaFood trial court applied this standard
in its post-verdict review of the amount of the punitive damages.
Because the MegaFood trial court did not order a remittitur in this
case, the trial court must have concluded that the jury's punitive
damages award fell "within the range that a rational juror would
be entitled to award in light of the record as a whole," and that
the award was based on "the statutory and common law factors
that allow an award of punitive damages for the specific claim at
issue."10 5
E. Traditional Deference or Heightened Review?
Traditionally, appellate courts have given great deference to
trial court determinations of excessiveness The trial judge
oversees the trial and, therefore, is in a far better position than an
appellate judge to determine whether a jury verdict was prompted
by inappropriate factors such as undue sympathy for the plaintiff
or prejudice against the defendant. Thus, in most jurisdictions, an
appellate court ordinarily will not overturn a trial judge's decision
not to reduce a punitive damages award in the absence of evidence
that the trial court abused its discretion.1°6 Although the amount
of the punitive damages awarded against MegaFood is large,
nothing in the record indicates that the trial court abused its
discretion in allowing the award to stand.
Contrary to the traditional deference, however, a recent
empirical study indicates that in product liability cases as many as
half of the punitive damage awards that go to appeal are reduced
significantly.1" Thus, the current appellate trend appears to be
a heightened level of review of punitive damages in product
104. Oberg v. Honda Motor Co., 888 P.2d 8, 10 (Or. 1995).
105. Id
106. See, e.g., Holcroft v. Missouri-Kan.-Tex. R.R. Co., 607 S.W.2d 158, 164 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1980).
107. Michael Rustad, In Defense of Punitive Damages in Products Liability: Testing Tort
Anecdotes with Empirical Data, 78 IOWA L. REv. 1, 57 (1992).
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liability cases. Appellate courts no longer are reluctant to reduce
or reverse punitive damages awards. This recent phenomenon
may be due in part to appellate judges who favor big business
defendants"' 8 The only multi-million dollar punitive damage
awards to be upheld on appeal have been cases involving aggravat-
ed misconduct that resulted in serious injury or death."9
Whether the MegaFood reviewing judge will deem this award
excessive depends upon a variety of factors including how the
judge views the roles of the appellate court, jury, and trial judge.
An appellate judge with faith in the U.S. jury system and the
sound discretion of U.S. trial judges might well conclude that the
amount of the punitive damage award was "within the range that
a rational juror would be entitled to award in light of the record
as a whole."' 10
On the other hand, the appellate judge may share the
concerns of tort reformers who worry about the negative impact
of large punitive damage awards in product liability cases. Given
current trends, an appellate judge may likely decide that the
amount of the award was excessive. Thus, without having a
familiarity with the specific judge's viewpoint, predicting whether
the reviewing judge will reduce the MegaFood punitive damages
award is impossible.
If the judge determines that the award was excessive, the
judge generally has the option of ordering a new trial on the issue
or a remittitur of part of the award. Assuming that the amount of
the award was the only error in the case, the judge probably would
grant a remittitur rather than require the parties to undergo the
expense of a new trial.
The amount of the reduction of the award, however, is
difficult to assess. In Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co.,"' the Cali-
fornia Court of Appeal reduced a $125 million award to $3.5
million. In this famous case, Ford Pinto allegedly balanced the
cost of lives lost in fiery automobile crashes against the expense of
a recall. Despite the "outrageousness"'1 2 of the conduct, the
punitive damages award was greatly reduced. In MegaFood,
108. See Theodore Eisenberg & James A. Henderson Jr., Inside the Quiet Revolution
in Products Liability, 39 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 731, 743 (1992).
109. See, e.g., Oberg v. Honda Motor Co., 888 P.2d at 13.
110. id. at 10.
111. 119 Cal. App. 3d 757 (1981).
112. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(2) (1965).
858 [Vol. 17:829
Punitive Damages in the United States
neither the injuries suffered as a result of MegaFood's misconduct
nor the nature and degree of the misconduct rises to the level of
the defendant's conduct in the Grimshaw case. Thus, if other
appellate decisions are an accurate gauge, the reviewing judge may
be inclined to reduce the MegaFood award quite drastically.
The recent approach of tort reformers, of capping punitive
damages at some multiple of compensatory damages, may also
influence the judge, though, this approach seems a strange way to
assess the amount of damages needed to punish and deter
sufficiently. It is likely to be inaccurate because the amount of
compensatory damages is not always a reliable indicator of the
character of the conduct resulting in liability for punitive damages.
Taking a different approach, the reviewing judge could simply pick
a round number such as $500,000 or even $1,000,000 to send a
clear message to the defendant and to others that knowing
disregard for consumer safety will not be tolerated.
Regardless of how the judge reviewing the award on appeal
resolves the excessiveness issue here, a strong possibility exists that
Smith v. MegaFood will be among the last cases in which any judge
will have to struggle with the excessiveness issue in a product
liability case. Indicators suggest that advocates of tort reform will
be successful in persuading Congress to cap punitive damages in
product liability cases in state and federal courts."' If the cap
becomes law, the amount of punitive damages no longer will be an
issue requiring appellate review.
VII. CONCLUSION
Smith v. MegaFood aptly illustrates the variety of issues that
may arise in a case involving a large punitive damage award as-
sessed against a U.S. corporation in a product liability case.
Controversy over the proper resolution of those issues continues
to rage. Concern for the future of U.S. business has prompted
113. 23 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) 526 (1995) (citing The Common Sense
Product Liability and Legal Reform Act, H.R. 956, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1995); The
Fairness in Product Liability Act, S. 565,104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1995)). Both H.R. 956 and
S. 565 provide for limits on the size of punitive damage awards. H.R. 956 caps punitive
damage awards so that a plaintiff may recover no more than the greater of $250,000 or
three times the amount awarded as economic damages. S. 565 applies only in product
liability actions and limits plaintiffs to the greater of $250,000 or twice compensatory
damages. The fate of each act, upon presentation to the Conference Committee and
submission to President Clinton for signature, remains to be seen.
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significant changes in the law of punitive damages in many
jurisdictions and attempts to control the remedy through federal
legislation. In spite of the efforts of tort reformers and business
interests, however, it is unlikely that the award of punitive
damages in product liability will ever be eliminated completely.
As the Supreme Court of New Jersey noted in a product liability
case, the doctrine of punitive damages survives because "it con-
tinues to serve the useful purposes of expressing society's disap-
proval of intolerable conduct and deterring such conduct where no
other remedy would suffice.7
11 4
114. Fischer v. Johns-Manville Corp., 512 A.2d 466,472 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1986). See also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(1) (1965).
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